Бялата книга на Европейската комисия от 2014 г.

сполучливо разрешение на регулаторната празнота във връзка с миноритарните дялови участия, неосигуряващи контрол, или пример за свръхрегулация?

Резюме

The articles examines, first, the theories of harm as a consequence of non-controlling minority shareholdings. Next, the European Commission’s proposals published in the 2014 White Paper are discussed. These proposals aim to overcome the harm of non-controlling minority shareholdings and the regulatory gap in this regard, which became obvious in the court saga Ryanair/Aer Lingus. The gap consists in the Commission’s lack of competence to demand the divestiture of minority shareholdings impeding competition in the absence of transfer of control and, respectively, concentration as per Regulation 139/2004. In the evaluation of the proposals for reform special attention is paid to its proportionality – whether the reform would lead to unjustified burden on the institutions as well as the private sector in a free market economy. A historical overview is provided of the Commission’s practice in dealing with mergers on EU level prior to the first Regulation on this matter, which refers to the application of Art. Art. 101–102 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. Finally, a conclusion is made that the proposed reform is viable, but several remarks, which are aimed at its improvement, are discussed in the article as requiring further consideration.