

MANAGING DIVERSITY IN THE EU: FROM 9/11 TO CHARLIE HEBDO

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This paper will discuss the transformation of the ways in which the European States have responded to the challenges posed by September 11, Breivik massacre in 2011 and Charlie Hebdo Massacre in 2015. The main premise of the paper is that Charlie Hebdo massacre has recently displayed that major European states such as France and Germany have changed the ways in which they used to frame migration, diversity and Islam. In the aftermath of the September 11, while the EU states preferred to externalize the causes of the structural problems of unemployment, poverty, racism and exclusion by securitizing, stigmatizing, politicizing, culturalizing, religionizing migration and integration issues, they have recently preferred to frame such issues as their own internal problems due to the high cost of the former way of framing the reality and to the detrimental effects of the financial crisis hitting the European space. I assume that such a discursive shift performed by the leading states of the EU is very promising in the sense that the culturalization of what is social, economic and political is likely to come to an end in the EU.

The process of securitization in the aftermath of the Cold War

During the Cold War period, the notion of „security“ used to be defined in political and military terms as the protection of a state's boundaries, its integrity and its values against the dangers of a hostile international arena.¹ Nowadays, however, security concerns are not only reduced to protecting states against ideological and military threats: they are also related to issues such as migration, ethnic revival, religious revival (Islam), environmental problems, identity claims and sometimes, supranational entities such as the EU. Lately, migration has been presented in the Western public space as a *security threat* that must be dealt with. One could argue that modern states tend to extend the fear of „migrants“ and „others“ by categorizing, stigmatizing, statisticalizing and coupling migration together with major problems such as

¹ Roxanne L. Doty, „Immigration and the Politics of Security“, *Security Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2-3 (2000), p.73. For a detailed analysis of the process of securitization in the post-Cold War era, see Ayhan Kaya, *Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization* (London: Palgrave, 2012).

unemployment, violence, crime, insecurity, drug trafficking and human smuggling.² This tendency is reinforced by the use of racist and xenophobic terminology that dehumanizes migrants. One can see this racist and dehumanizing tone in various terms popularly used in everyday life such as „influx of migrants“, „invasion of migrants“, „the country is flooded with migrants“ and „intrusion of migrants“, which are often used to mean large numbers of migrants. And recently increasing number of tragedies in the Mediterranean resulting with the death of several boat people is likely to reinforce the idea that migration is a great danger threatening societal, political, cultural and economic security of the European Union.

Issues such as migration, poverty and isolation have recently become security issues through a process of social construction, namely „securitization“. As the main rationale of the security discourse seems to have shifted from *protecting the state* to *protecting society*, protection of society against any kind of „evil“ has become the pillar of the security discourse in a way that has popularized the term security. The securitization of migration, or in other words stigmatization of migrants, became a vital issue especially after the September 11 attacks in the United States and elsewhere, notably after the Madrid (11 March 2004) and London (7 July 2005) bombings. Recently, there is a similar kind of process resulting from the threat of the Islamic State (ISIS) leading to the Charlie Hebdo Massacre and also to the PEGIDA movement in Germany.

Much of the response to these attacks has focused on immigration issues, although the perpetrators of the bombings were mostly products of the „society“ they attacked.³ The so-called „home-born terrorists“ or „home-grown terrorists“ were even coined to underline the fact that they were mostly the products of the societies they attacked. The Kouachy Brothers were not also an exception.⁴ I argue that the categorization of those responsible as migrants through the security discourse seems to be a systematic attempt to externalize the structural failures produced by the neo-liberal social-political structure. The security discourse conceals the fact that ethno-religious claims of migrants and their reluctance to integrate actually result from existing structural problems of poverty, unemployment, discrimination, xenophobia, nationalism and racism. To put it differently, the public perception of migration as the principal source of present disorder masks the actual causes of the globalized social-political discontent. It is likely that modern states tend to employ the discourse of securitization as a political technique that can integrate a society politically by staging a convincing existential threat in the form of an internal, or even an external, enemy, an enemy that is created by security agencies by categorizing and stigmatizing migration together with drug trafficking, human trafficking, criminality and terrorism.⁵

² Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity* (London: Routledge, 2006).

³ Michael Collyer, „Migrants, Migration and the Security Paradigm: Constraints and Opportunities“, *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (July 2006), p. 267.

⁴ For the profiles of the Kouachy Brothers, see „Profiles: key suspects in Paris attacks,“ *The Guardian*, 9 January 2015, available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/09/-sp-profiles-key-suspects-paris-attacks-france-charlie-hebdo>, accessed on 19 May 2015.

⁵ Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity* (London: Routledge, 2006).

Recent research on the securitization of migration rightfully draws our attention to the fact that, at the official level, modern state institutions address only an insignificant correlation between undocumented migration and the problems of global poverty, debt, health, environment and unemployment fostered by the neo-liberal economic model.⁶ The issue of „illegal migrants“ has lately been picked up by populist and right-wing extremist political elite and state administrations in the west as the very source of some endemic problems such as unemployment, violence, terror and some other social and cultural problems.

Anti-illegal immigration activity operates as a technology of anti-citizenship portraying those to be excluded from citizenry, and implies crucial issues of belonging, identity, inclusion and exclusion. It has become a popular sport for the neo-liberal states to address the following groups as anti-citizens to be excluded from political, social, economic and even cultural resources: petty criminals, muggers, prostitutes, pimps, the homeless, gang members, drug offenders, murderers, illegal migrants, refugees, and the like.⁷ The archetype of this anti-citizen is the North African in France, the Turkish in Germany, Belgium or the Netherlands, and African-American or Latino in the United States. In this regard, one could argue that both securitization of migration and anti-illegal immigration activities, techniques and programs serve as a form of governmentality in the interest of the political authority. For instance, Didier Bigo, a French scholar, clearly explains the ways in which the act of governmentality operates in relation to foreigners. Proliferation of border controls, the repression of foreigners and so on, has less to do with protection than with a political attempt to reassure certain segments of the electorate longing for evidence of concrete measures taken to ensure safety.⁸

Governmentality is the art of governing a population rather than a territory.⁹ Sometimes, the immigrant, the stranger, the excluded, the one who does not belong to the prescribed national unity is ideologically portrayed by the conventional and culturalist elite as the „enemy within“. ¹⁰ This line of thinking which excludes those who do not culturally, ethnically and religiously belong, presumes the immigrant against whom the nation, the population, should be redefined. From late 1970s,

⁶ Some of these works are as follows: Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: a New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Saskia Sassen, „A Universal Harm: Making Criminals of Migrants“, *OpenDemocracy* <http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article-10-96-1444.jsp#>, 20 August 2003; Frank Dövell, „Crossing the Fringes of Europe: Transit Migration in the EU's Neighbourhood“, *Centre on Migration, Policy and Society Working Paper 33* (2006); Doty, „Immigration and the Politics of Security“; and Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity*.

⁷ Jonathan X. Inda, *Targetting Immigrants: Government, Technology and Ethics* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), p. 53.

⁸ Didier Bigo, „To Reassure and Protect after September 11th“, *Social Science Research Council Essays: 2* (2002), <http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/bigo.htm>, accessed on 10 May 2015.

⁹ Michel Foucault describes the concept of governmentality as a collection of methods used by political power to maintain its power, or as an art of acquiring power. See Michel Foucault, „Governmentality“, *Ideology and Consciousness*, Vol. 6 (1979): pp. 5-21.

¹⁰ Roxanne L. Doty, „Racism, Desire, and the Politics of Immigration“, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 28 No. 3 (1999), p. 597.

the discourse on immigration focused on the immigrant as antithetical to the interests of the nation-state, and since the early 1980s it has become commonplace to hear that migration is a threat to national identity.

Fortress Europe: Ultra-Politics of Symbols

Given the importance of regional cooperation on migration control it is also worth briefly considering how the linkage between migration and terrorism was treated in political rhetoric at the EU level. The Council of Ministers in the area of Justice and Home Affairs held extraordinary meetings following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, as well as 11 March and 7 July 2005 in London. In their 20 September 2001 Declaration, the Council did state the need to „strengthen controls at external borders“; but the only explicit linkage to migration was the „risk of large-scale population movements as a result of heightened tensions following the attacks on the U.S.“.¹¹ In the meeting held on 19 March 2004 in the aftermath of the Madrid bombing there was again a reference to „strengthening border controls“, and the initiative to create „an integrated borders management agency“ was mentioned as relevant to counter-terrorism activities. But migration control was not otherwise mentioned, except in the context of the problem of support for religious extremism amongst members of EU countries,¹² a theme that received greater attention in the statement following the London bombings. EU discussions on migration policy, meanwhile, continued to follow the timetable and goals set out in the European Council conclusions that pre-dated 9/11. Migration control remained high on the list of priorities, but the explicit rationale for this focus was the need to combat trafficking, and to better protect Europe’s external borders from unwanted immigration. Previously, the Schengen Treaty (1985) was signed by the European Union countries to abolish the internal borders within the Union, to reinforce the external borders against illegal migration, human smuggling, drug trafficking and organized crime, to create a buffer zone with the neighboring countries, to pursue a common visa policy, and to form an Information System amongst the contracting parties. Starting with five member states, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, „the Schengenland“ has now reached twenty-four countries including the two non-EU countries, Norway and Iceland. Similarly, the most significant European Council document emerging from the period after 2001, The Hague Program, again failed to draw a link between terrorism and migration control. It stressed the need for better-managed migration in order to prevent „humanitarian disasters“ - but again, migration control was not defined as a means of excluding potential terrorists.¹³


The problem lies in the very nature of the EU, which is gradually becoming more like a territorial state over the last 20 years. In this regard, maps, media images and statistics become influential ideological tools contributing to the

¹¹ Extraordinary Council Meeting - Justice, Home Affairs and Civil Protection, Brussels, 20 September 2001 (12019/01, Presse 327).


¹² Extraordinary Council Meeting - Justice and Home Affairs, Brussels, 19 March 2004 (7555/04, Presse 94).

¹³ The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union, Annex 1, Presidency Conclusions - Brussels, 5 November 2004 (1492/04).

production of a sterile European space free of the others who are ethno-culturally and religiously different. For instance, maps displaying the routes undertaken by „illegal migrants“ to get into the EU, have been employed as ideological tools in order to territorialize the European space in a way that permits the European subject to internalize territorial Europe easily. Maps can also frame others as enemies. This is the most cunning and radical version of „ultra-politics“. As Slavoj Žižek defines it, this is „an attempt to de-politicize conflict by way of bringing it to an extreme, via the direct militarization of politics: the „foreclosed“ political returns in the real, in the guise of the attempt to resolve the deadlock of the political conflict, by its false radicalization, i.e. by way of reformulating it as a war between „us“ and „them“, our enemy, where there is no common ground for symbolic conflict.“¹⁴



Map 1. Recent Migration Routes



Map 2. Armed Forces Routes in World War II

¹⁴ Slavoj Žižek, „For a leftist appropriation of the European legacy“, Journal of Political Ideologies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (February 1998), pp.63-78.

What is the difference between the two maps? The former displays the east-west and south-north migration routes while the latter shows the movement of armed forces during World War II. Both maps present the direction of threats coming from somewhere and heading for another destination. Migrants and armed forces are perceived as identical challenges in the imagery of individuals. In other words, maps make objects visible. The map-makers are engaged in a process of manipulation rather than of objective and faithful representation.¹⁵

Then, maps certainly offer powerful evidence of an ideologically motivated reorganization of geographical space. Maps are certainly ideological installations. On the one hand, they portray accumulated modern understandings of how the world should be represented (i.e., the Arctic is on top and Antarctica on the bottom), but they also portray more specific ideological or cultural narratives. For instance, for European students, the maps they have on their walls of their classrooms, with the Europe front and center, are „correct“ maps. These maps lead Europeans to construct an ethnocentric perspective, locating Europe in the very center of the world. On the contrary, the maps that Japanese students draw, have Japan front and center, and Europe on the far-left of the map.¹⁶ There are other tools operating in the same way: surveys, reports, newspaper columns, statistics, pictures, numbers, charts and graphs. All these routine tools render things into visible, calculable and programmable forms. These are all mundane tools operating to demonstrate the phenomenon of migration as a threat to national, societal and cultural security of a given territory.

Similarly, the dominant regimes of representation are performed in a way that migrant groups, or their descendants, are stereotypically perceived and represented by the majority media. To illustrate these dominant regimes of representation, a brief examination of some of the media and „scientific“ works produced in Germany is quite revealing. *Der Spiegel* (14 April 1997), a prominent liberal weekly magazine, denounced the „foreigners“ in the country as „dangerously alien“ and as the cause of the failure of the „multicultural society“. In the magazine, Turkish youths in Germany were presented as „criminals“, „fundamentalists“, „nationalist“ and „traumatic“. A similar trend to the media coverage of the Turks in Germany was also exhibited in academia.

Wilhelm Heitmeyer, whose article was referred to in *Der Spiegel*, has become a polemical name after the publication of his book on the German-Turkish youth, *Verlockender Fundamentalismus* [Enticing Fundamentalism], in which he concluded that it is the Turks who are not tempted to integrate and incorporate themselves into the system.¹⁷ His main criterion in declaring the self-isolationist

¹⁵ Susan Bassnett, „At the Edges of the World: Drawing New Maps“, *Comparative Criticism*. No. 15 (1993), p. 43.

¹⁶ For further explanation on the ideological nature of maps see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983): 163-186.

¹⁷ Wilhelm Heitmeyer, Joachim Müller and Helmut Schruder, *Verlockender Fundamentalismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1997).

tendency of the Turkish-origin youths was their contentment to live with Islam and Turkishness.¹⁸

The process of „othering“ of migrants in public imagery is also apparent in the „statisticalizing“ of illegal migrants through the use of a variety of numerical technologies such as statistics, population, counts, demographic trends, economic forecasts, and the like. Statistical data on illegal migrants usually draws security forces' attention to refugees and asylum seekers originating from Third World countries, who often travel in those „boats“ and „trucks“ that have become indispensable scenes in our daily news media. However, there have recently been some studies that have examined and decoded some of this data, and they reveal that most of the so-called illegal migrants are not actually those „boat people“, or „truck people“ suffering inhuman conditions. Instead, the figures actually hide „overstayers“, who go on staying in countries even after their visas expire.¹⁹ Interestingly enough, most of the illegal migrants in Australia are British overstayers, whilst it is the Americans in the UK, not the Africans, Asians, Eritreans or Syrians. Frank Düvell cites studies that suggest that for all the media frenzy generated by images of boats emptying desperate travelers on Italy's islands and shores, only 10 percent of the irregular migrant population arrived in Italy on boats.²⁰

Another striking example about the ideological nature of statistics interpellating the reality. One can recall how conservative political circles raised the „Polish plumber“ issue in France on the eve of the European Constitutional referendum on 29 May 2005.²¹ The French Society of Plumbers revealed that the total number of plumbers of

¹⁸ Bashing multiculturalism has also become a popular sport in the EU, which is being repeated from time to time. One should not underestimate the destructive effects of such nationalist anti-multiculturalist rhetoric on Western societies such as Norway and the UK. For instance, the myths that Muslim immigrants are taking over Europe and that multiculturalism is harmful contributed to the murder of seventy-nine individuals by right-wing extremist Anders Behring Breivik in Norway on 22 July 2011 (see BBC website, 23 July 2011, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14259356>> accessed 15 August 2013). In a similar vein, British PM David Cameron had also criticized the multiculturalist rhetoric in February 2011, a few months before the London riots in August 2011. In boroughs where more than half the youth centres have closed, youth unemployment is rising, and negative experience with police is repeated through the generations, many children and young adults feel that neither the state nor the community has anything to offer them. For further detail on the notorious speech of David Cameron on multiculturalism, see <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12415597>> (accessed 16 August 2013); and for more detail on the London riots, see <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14436499>> (accessed 16 May 2015). For a detailed account of the critics of multiculturalism as well as of republicanism see Ayhan Kaya, „Backlash of Multiculturalism and Republicanism in Europe“, *Philosophy and Social Criticism Journal*, 38 (2012): 399-411.

¹⁹ William Walters, „Security, Territory, Metagovernance: Critical Notes on Anti-illegal Immigration Programmes in the European Union“ Paper presented at Istanbul Bilgi University on 7 December 2006.

²⁰ Frank Düvell, „Crossing the Fringes of Europe: Transit Migration in the EU's Neighbourhood“, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society Working Paper 33 (2006): p. 17.

²¹ The phrase „Polish plumber“ (*Plombier polonais* in French) was first used by Philippe de Villiers, a member of the European Parliament, and opponents of the European Constitution as a symbol of cheap labour coming in from Central Europe as a result of the Directive on services in the internal market during the EU Constitution referendum in France in 2005. For a further detail on the debates regarding the rejection of the European Constitution in the French and Dutch referenda respectively held in 29 May and 1 June 2005 see, Anders Samuelsen (ed.), *One Union Many Voices: The EU meets the people* (Brussels: Anders Samuelsen, 2005).

Polish origin in France was only 140 at that time, which was an insufficient number to challenge the domestic labor market at all.²² And one should also recognize that modern times make it possible that British or German plumbers prefer to operate in the Spanish or Turkish Riviera. Problematising these issues do not really make sense as the Spanish IT specialists are recently migrating to Germany to work for lower salaries and their German counterparts go to either Switzerland, or Austria, to work for higher salaries. Mobility is certainly the most absolute reality of our times. Stereotypically casting migration and emphasizing its disruptive consequences, the media also plays a role in the securitization process of migration. Migration is often presented as an imagined alien enemy that undermines a society's culture, saps its scarce resources, steals its jobs and introduces alien customs and religions.

Statisticalizing of migration has apparently given „illegal“ immigration visibility as a phenomenon of „great“ magnitude. Words such as „flood“, „invasion“ and „out of control“ have often been used to characterize the flow of „illegal“ migrants all around the world. Politicians, journalists and sometimes scholars have picked up and reported on the enumeration of „illegal“ migrants as a challenge to be tackled.²³ A comparative study of parliamentary discourse in various Western European countries (France, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Spain, and UK) it was revealed that:

Refugees are (...) primarily seen as a financial burden, and virtually never as an opportunity for the country. They tend to be associated with illegality, if not with crime, and in many other respects are represented in negative ways. Politicians, in their parliamentary speeches, will thus on the one hand present themselves as tolerant and understanding, but more often than not their speeches will more subtly or blatantly convey the idea that refugees are not welcome in Europe. The same is true for debates about residing minority groups within the country. Except from a few notable antiracist voices, the discourse of the political elites thus confirms and reformulates the broader anteforeigner sentiments in the European Union.²⁴

Immigrant-bashing has become a popular sport by ministers, politicians, media specialists and even Prime Ministers in the European Union as well as in the other parts of the world. Today, hostile language, offensive language, racist statements, and anti-immigrant policy propositions or real measures take place everyday in the

²² Cited in Krzysztof Rybicki, „Global Labour Market and its Limitations: Reasons and effects of the emergence of homo sapiens globalus“, Address of the Deputy President of the National Bank of Poland in the „Debate: Workers 2020 - a vision of the labour market and the labour environment in the forthcoming decades“, Gdańsk 10 June 2006, http://www.nbp.pl/en/publikacje/lectures/Rybicki_gdansk.pdf, accessed 14 May 2015.

²³ For the scholarly works see Richard D. Lamm and Gary Imhoff, *The Immigration Time Bomb: The Fragmenting of America* (New York: Truman Talley Books, 1985); Palmer Stacy and Lutton Wayne, *The Immigration Time Bomb*. Monterey (Virginia: American Immigration Control Foundation, 1985); and Pim Fortuyn, *De islamisering van onze cultuur* (Uitharn: Karakter Uitgevers, 2001).

²⁴ Ruth Wodak and van Dijk, Teun A. (Eds.), *Racism at the Top. Parliamentary Discourses on Ethnic Issues in Six European States* (Austria, Klagenfurt/Celovec: Drava, 2000), pp. 10-11.

news. Conversely, aggressive language and threats directed against politicians who are perceived to be at fault, for whatever reason, have spread as well. The language of hatred replaces the language of dialogue.

In lieu of conclusion: end of the clash of civilizations paradigm

To reiterate, migration has recently been framed as a source of fear and instability for the nation-states in the West. Yet, not so long ago it was rather a source of contentment and happiness. Several different reasons like deindustrialization, changing technology, unemployment, poverty and neo-liberal political economy can be mentioned to explicate the reasons of such a discontent. Furthermore, the enormous demographic change caused by the dissolution of the Eastern Block should not be underestimated. The period starting in 1989 signifies the beginning of a new historical epoch leading to massive migration of ethnic Germans, ethnic Hungarians, ethnic Russians and Russian Jews from one place to another. The mobilization of millions of people stimulated nation-states to change their migration policies in a way that encouraged the arrival of immigrants from similar ethnic backgrounds.

This period of demographic change in Western Europe went in tandem with the rise of discourses like the „clash of civilizations“, „culture wars“ and Islamophobia that presented societal heterogeneity in an unfavorable light. The intensification of Islamophobia was made easier by al-Qaeda type violence and the radicalization of some segments of Muslim origin immigrant communities in several countries reinforced the societal unrest resulting from immigration. The result was the introduction of restrictive migration policies and increased territorial border security *vis-à-vis* the nationals of third countries who originated from outside the European continent. However, keeping in mind that demographic deficit and emigration in the European countries are now becoming the realities of everyday life, one could conclude that such a migrant-phobia is not sustainable.

Breivik incidence leading to the death of 79 Norwegian citizens on 22 July 2011 was the last drop signaling the unsustainability of Islamophobic and migrant-phobic discourse, or what I call the ideology of Islamophobia, by the neo-liberal conservative states.²⁵ Until very recently, Islamophobia was not really on the agenda of the EU countries, which have been somehow hit by the current financial crisis, austerity measures, unemployment and social upheavals. The rise of ISID in the Middle East triggered again the societal fear against Islam in the EU countries. PEGIDA was one of the first signs of these growing Islamophobic sentiments. But the question is that if these Islamophobic sentiments were going to be exploited by the ruling political elite in order to reformulate an ideology of Islamophobia. I believe that many European states having experienced the

²⁵ For a detailed discussion on the ideology of Islamophobia see Ayhan Kaya, „Islamophobia as an Ideology in the West: Scapegoating Muslim-Origin Migrants,“ in Anna Amelina, Kenneth Horvath and Dr. Bruno Meeus (eds.), *International Handbook of Migration and Social Transformation in Europe* (London: Routledge, 2015).

detrimental effects of September 11 have chosen not to exploit the rising tide of Islamophobic and migrant-phobic societal sentiments.

There are already some positive signs coming from France, Germany, and Spain, which indicate that EU is at the verge of transcending the binary oppositions brought about by the political and societal climate of the September 11, and the paradigm of the Clash of Civilizations, or Alliance of Civilizations dating back to the Bosnian War in the 1990s. France, because Francois Hollande and the French officials were very careful in the aftermath of Charlie Hebdo Massacre in using a cohesive political discourse in order not to bash Islam in a way that was very different from the former Sarkozy presidency. Hollande's statement about the Charlie Hebdo Massacre having nothing to do with Islam, and the French Officials' defining the terrorists as „three French terrorists“ without using any religious markers were very well thought ways of framing the reality. Unlike the former political elite, the Socialists were simply making a political statement that Charlie Hebdo massacre was an internal problem. Similarly, Angela Merkel and the German state officials were also very careful this time in picking up their side with the anti-PEGIDA movements denouncing the rise of populist racist discourse against Islam, migrants and the Turks. Finally, a very interesting move came from the Spanish state, which officially decided to withdraw from the initiative of Alliance of Civilizations coordinated together with Turkey under the UN umbrella since 2005. Let me conclude saying that I am nowadays more inclined to believe that culturalist, religious and civilizational rhetoric, which has been very popular since the 1990s, especially since the birth of the Huntingtonian paradigm of Clash of Civilizations, is now coming to an end, and a social-economic and political discourse is likely to be gaining ground in the western world. These could be the signs of a New Start...