Reinforcing European economic security and cyber resilience
getting real on strategic autonomy
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.60054/PEU.2024.11.34-43Ключови думи :
Economic security, Cyber resilience, Strategic autonomyАбстракт
Within its current mandate, the European Commission has demonstrated a growing ambition on the EU‘s positioning on the global stage. From “strategic autonomy” to “geopolitical Union”, the bar has been set high. In reality, however, there has been modest progress in truly bolstering the EU‘s collective toolbox on the supranational level for mitigating economic risks or digital threats from external actors. This article takes stock of the recent Commission strategy on economic security and proposed legislation on improving cyber resilience.
The text analyses the current proposals and makes the case that member states are long overdue in developing improved tools for screening of foreign direct investments, better coordination on the export of dual-use items and preventing the leakage of advanced research and European knowhow to third countries. Moreover, these measures need to be coupled with an upgraded notion of cyber resilience given all the threats stemming from adversarial state and non-state actors, exposure of critical digital infrastructure, compromised Internet of Things devices, as well as malign software and digital applications online. The upcoming Commission mandate (2024-2029) will be crucial for making these ambitions a reality and responding to the rapidly expanding geopolitical challenges and external threats.
Литература (библиография)
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